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This survey first discusses general characteristics, advantages, and disadvantages of 
different types of fiscal rules. It then reviews the experience with fiscal rules in seven 
Latin American countries. Only Chile targets cyclically adjusted indicators although 
Colombia is going the “Chilean way” and the Mexican rule offers some stabilization 
properties. Argentina, Brazil and Peru apply numerical rules targeting the 
overall/primary public balance and/or the public spending. The Venezuelan framework 
has been substantially diluted or abandoned after introduction. The institutional 
coverage depends on the degree of decentralization of the fiscal systems with many 
countries including debt limits to the subnational governments as a key tool to face the 
common pool problem that emerges in federal states. All in all, it seems that fiscal 
rules in Latin America have been more effective in helping to strengthen the long term 
sustainability than in responding to shocks as proved by the recent financial crisis. 
Fiscal rules have had to be fine‐tuned along the years and a “second generation” of 
fiscal rules may be necessary in order to increase their efficiency. 
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Introduction 
The common ownership of public resources2, principal-agent problems3, time 
inconsistency problems4 and the political budget cycles5 create a bias towards fiscal 
deficits. This has led to many debt defaults in the history of the Latin America region. 
The distortions mentioned in the previous paragraph also often lead to public 
expenditure distortions and procyclicality. According to standard economic policy, 
fiscal policy should be countercyclical. In the neoclassical smoothing model of Barro 
(1979), a government should optimally run surpluses in good times and deficits in bad 
times. That is the same a government should do, though for different reasons, in the 
standard Keynesian or neo‐Keynesian framework. 
Yet there is a wealth of evidence on the procyclicality of fiscal policy in Latin 
America (see Gavin and Perotti, 1997; and Kaminsky et al., 2005) which contributes to 
macroeconomic volatility, depresses investment in real and human capital, hampers 
growth and increases fiscal vulnerability. This procyclical nature of the fiscal policy in 
the region has been exacerbated by: i) the relative scarcity, uncertainty and high 
volatility of revenues (with Brazil and, to a lesser extent, Argentina being exceptions) 
as commodity‐linked revenues (taxes, royalties, profits) can be a large portion of 
government revenue; ii) the pervasive rigidities in public expenditures (which have led 
to a concentration of fiscal adjustments on public investments); iii) the need for 
ensuring progress to reduce poverty and inequality which are very high in the region; 
iv) the exposure of some countries in the region to pronounced economic fluctuations 
–shocks from sharp changes in the terms of trade as they are rich in commodities, 
price takers and small open economies‐ and to procyclical capital flows; and, v) in bad 
times (sudden stops and/or negative trade‐related shocks) governments in emerging 
markets are credit‐constrained while when times improve are free to go on a debt‐
financed spending spree (see Alberola and Montero, 2006). Thus, avoidance of 
procyclicality requires first and foremost the creation of adequate “fiscal space” 
(saving revenue windfalls in good times) to prevent the emergence of such financing 
constraints in bad times, or to prevent the rapid changes in investor sentiment and 
ease the vulnerability to financial crises, especially given the small size of automatic 
stabilizers (mainly due to informality). 
A large empirical literature suggests that market discipline is certainly not a 
sufficient deterrent against deficit biases and/or fiscal procyclicality: if anything, the 
                                                 
2
 The common pool problem is the fact that recipients of public spending fail to fully internalize the costs 
that taxpayers must assume. For example, in a monetary union among sovereign nations or among sub‐
national entities, there may be adverse externalities created by a loose fiscal behaviour of one member 
of the union for other members. This free rider behavior of lower‐level governments assumes that the 
central government and other lower‐level governments will adopt a compensatory policy course, or that 
the central government will bail out subnational governments as they run into financial trouble. 
3
 The principal-agent problems arise between voters and political authorities due to lack of 
representation of future generations, sensitivity to special‐interest lobbies, corruption and use of 
asymmetric and biased information. 
4
 Policies that were agreed to ex ante are not adhered to ex post. 
5
 Politicians are inclined to use public spending to advance their re‐election prospects whenever an 
election approaches. See Nieto‐Parra and Santiso (2010) for the analysis of political budget cycles in 
Latin American countries. 
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market seems to penalize fiscal profligacy in a discontinuous fashion only at a late 
stage. So, starting in New Zealand in 1994, an increasing number of countries around 
the world have steadily adopted fiscal rules (defined as standing commitments to 
specified numerical targets for some key budget and/or debt aggregates and to some 
procedures) over the past two decades (IMF, 2009b)6 to tackle the problems 
mentioned above. 
This rules‐based framework is an application of the more general “rules rather 
than discretion” principle developed by Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and 
Gordon (1983) in monetary policy (inflation bias is the result of discretion but rules 
have a cost because they cannot include all possible contingencies and hence do not 
allow for an optimal response to unforeseen circumstances). In monetary policy the 
tension was motivated by the 1970s “Great Inflation”, was intellectually grounded in 
the rational expectations revolution in macroeconomic and was solved by delegating 
the task of conducting policy to an independent agency (the central bank) that can act 
with discretion but does not suffer from inflation bias because it is either more 
conservative than society as a whole (Rogoff, 1985) or has incentive contracts (Walsh, 
1995). 
In contrast to monetary policy rules and institutions, fiscal rules and institutions 
have received less attention by policymakers and academic researchers alike. Fiscal 
policy discretion may be beneficial under a number of circumstances (f.e., in the 
presence of unexpected shocks that require speedy policy action or virtuous politicians 
especially in Latin American countries where the unexpected shocks are large and lack 
large automatic stabilizers). But as explained before, there is growing evidence that 
discretion can be misused, leading to deficit bias, or the implementation of procyclical 
fiscal policies. In addition, things are more complicated in fiscal policy than in 
monetary policy because budget decisions are at the center of the political process and 
hence cannot be delegated to a politically unaccountable agency, which could expand 
the efficiency frontier in the tradeoff between flexibility and credibility (fiscal councils, 
unlike central banks in monetary policy, are just watchdogs that provide independent 
assessment of fiscal policy). Kopits (2001) argues that having a set of permanent, well‐
designed and properly implemented fiscal rules establishes a more depolitized 
framework for fiscal policy. In any case, although the ideal would be to adopt rules that 
allow for the highest credibility while limiting reduction in flexibility, it is bound that 
they are going to prevent an appropriate fiscal response in at least some 
circumstances. 
This survey focuses on a group of seven countries in Latin America (Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela) bringing their fiscal rules under 
scrutiny7. It explores a range of design features (the specific numerical target laid down 
by the rule, which can be expressed either as a percentage of GDP, in local currency 
units or a growth rate, and the period over which the rule is to be applied), statutory 
                                                 
6
 About 80 countries around the world currently use one or more rules based on numerical targets in 
their conduct of budgetary policies. For Spain’s case see, for example, the article “The reform of the 
fiscal framework in Spain: constitutional limits and the new public spending growth rule”, published in 
the October 2011 edition of the Banco de España’s Economic Bulletin. 
7
 In five of these countries (Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru) fiscal policy rules have been 
embedded in an inflation targeting regime. 
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provisions (constitutional provisions, high‐level legislation, ordinary legislation that 
applies to governments over successive electoral cycles or merely a policy guideline), 
the penalties for non‐compliance (institutional or personal sanctions), institutional 
coverage (the level of government to which they apply) and operational arrangements 
(whether the rules include “escape clauses” ‐flexibility in special circumstances such as 
natural disasters and severe recessions‐). Table 1 presents a summary of these key 
components of their fiscal rules. After this introduction, Section 2 analyses the 
different forms of fiscal rules from a theoretical point of view. Each of the next seven 
sections describes the individual country experiences with fiscal rules. Section 10 
presents a general assessment of the fiscal rules in the region and Section 11 offers 
some concluding remarks. 
 
Types of fiscal rules 
Although fiscal rules have in common as its main objective to promote 
consistency with the intertemporal budget constraint, they take varied forms 
depending on the emphasis on long term sustainability (reduce the deficit bias and 
control the growth in public debt) or in reducing procyclicality of fiscal policy (short 
term stabilization) 8. The first type of rules (those mainly based on signaling a 
commitment to fiscal sustainability) are based on numerical targets imposed on: i) the 
public debt defined in terms of revenues, debt service costs of GDP (stock indicators of 
fiscal performance); and/or, ii) flow indicators of fiscal performance (public deficits, 
primary public deficits, total revenue, total expenditure or specific spending 
categories) at various levels of government. In some cases a so‐called “golden rule” (in 
which investment spending is excluded) is used to prevent crowding out much‐needed 
public investment9. These numerical fiscal rules may also include borrowing rules (e.g., 
prohibition of central bank financing). Potential disadvantages of numerical fiscal rules 
include lack of flexibility in fiscal policy, procyclical biases in some cases10, and 
incentives to rely on low quality measures to meet the targets. They can even foster 
the adoption of practices to circumvent numerical rules (reclassification of 
expenditures from current to capital items, using off‐budget public entities to perform 
government operations, using debt instruments not covered in debt limits, creative 
accounting, etc.) 11. 
The second type of fiscal rules (with mainly a character of allowing fiscal policy to 
respond acyclically to changing macroeconomic circumstances) is based on: i) a 
balanced budget requirement specified in a multiyear or medium‐term context public 
deficit over the cycle; or on, ii) numerical targets for the structural or cyclically‐
adjusted balance for each year (taking into account cyclical variables critical to the 
                                                 
8
 With a procyclical fiscal policy, budget deficits are asymmetric across the business cycle rising during 
recessions but not falling as much during booms. Thus averaged over the business cycle the budget 
deficit will be higher. As a consequence, public debt levels experience a ratchet effect. 
9
 See Carranza et al. (2011) for an analysis regarding public infrastructure investment and fiscal 
frameworks. 
10
 With expenditure ceilings, procyclicality can arise from the revenue side (during boom periods, 
governments might be tempted to cut taxes or increase tax expenditures). And as these rules set 
ceilings, not floors, for public expenditure, do not necessarily avoid procyclicality during downturns. 
11
 See Milesi‐Ferretti (2004). 
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public deficit such as GDP and/or prices of key commodities or, put it in a different 
way, to distinguish the part due to changes in the environment and the part due to 
changes in policy). But the definition of a medium‐term objective includes the 
temptation to take some leeway in the short term and count on correction at the end 
of the cycle. In the second case, structural balances, it raises a number of analytical 
issues as it is key to have a reliable indicator of the cyclical position of the economy 
(output gap) 12, the equilibrium price of some commodities and the extent to which 
individual budgetary items react to fluctuations in output (budgetary elasticities) and 
commodity prices. For example, if output grows quickly and is attributed to structural 
increases, the rule would imply that spending should be increased permanently. 
However, should the output increase be reversed, the government would be stuck 
with higher, difficult to reverse expenditure outlays. This suggests that government 
should be conservative in estimates of structural growth and revenue and may require 
depositing contingency reserves in a stabilization fund, generated from fiscal surpluses 
during economic booms, and allow withdrawals to finance deficits during recessions. 
But the creation of these stabilization funds requires not only distinguish transitory 
from permanent price shocks, but also to lay down rules for a transparent 
administration.  
There are, therefore, significant trade‐offs between the two main types of fiscal 
rules. Firstly, the objective of transparency and simplicity argues for the choice of fiscal 
rules that are simple and easily monitored (those based on numerical targets for the 
overall budget balance, the public expenditure or the gross public debt). Nonetheless, 
such rules do not provide adequate flexibility to accommodate large unexpected 
shocks nor may they help avoid procyclicality of budgetary policies. In addition, in the 
case of expenditure rules, they should be complemented by balance‐ or debt‐ based 
rules in order to ensure debt sustainability. On the other hand, cyclically adjusted fiscal 
balances are regularly used by international organizations and national institutions, 
but budgetary targets are seldom framed in cyclically adjusted terms. This reflects in 
part the relative complexity of the techniques used for the estimation of output gaps, 
long term commodity prices, and budgetary elasticities13,14. Moreover, as time passes 
subsequent computation of structural measures for a given period can give different 
results as revisions are made to past data15. Structural deficit rules also generate a 
communication nightmare. In summary, fiscal rules which are simpler, more 
transparent and easily monitored may not help avoid procyclicality of budgetary 
policies and/or may not provide adequate flexibility to accommodate large unexpected 
shocks. 
                                                 
12
 There is considerable evidence suggesting that, regardless of the methodology used, the estimates of 
the output gaps are generally subject to considerable margins of error, especially at the end of the 
sample period. Indeed, revisions of the gap estimates are often of the same order of magnitude and 
may even exceed of the gap itself. The above problems are more important in emerging market 
countries as shocks to trend growth are the primary source of fluctuations in emerging markets, thus 
blurring the simple distinction between trend and cycle (see Aguiar and Gopinath, 2007). 
13
 See IMF (2012) for an example of three different structural balance estimates for Peru. However, 
discrepancies in terms of fiscal impulse are smaller. 
14
 See IMF (2011b). 
15
 See as an example “The pain in Spain will test the euro” by Martin Wolf in Financial Times (March 6, 
2012). 
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The application of the fiscal rules can be limited to the national government or 
can also include other levels of government. Multiple levels of government multiply 
the possible reasons for failure of fiscal responsibility. Decentralization, which has 
increased in recent decades, reflecting primarily political pressures, has reduced the 
central administrative control over subnational fiscal behaviour16. As a result, 
subnational governments (SNGs hereafter) now account for substantial shares of 
public expenditures, in particular social and investment ones. When SNGs are included, 
provisions can be adopted either with a top‐down or a bottom‐up approach to ensure 
that they do not accumulate unsustainable debts and/or contingent liabilities, 
ultimately requiring either bailouts from the central government or abrupt adjustment 
programs. The top‐down approach under the surveillance of a central authority is 
usually introduced against the background of past bailouts or under some form of 
implicit or explicit guarantees to rescue SNGs in distress. Therefore, fiscal rules are 
especially useful in circumstances where markets cannot exert adequate discipline on 
national or subnational governments17. It is far more difficult to establish consistent 
fiscal rules through a bottom‐up approach, in which SNGs may adopt voluntary binding 
rules which can be ineffective. In that case, the central government must set a proper 
example and provide incentives for SNGs to adopt prudent fiscal policies. It is also 
important the particular political structure of the country. The federal countries 
(Argentina, Brazil and Mexico) tend to be more fiscally decentralized and the national 
government cannot decide unilaterally. By contrast, in the unitary countries (Colombia 
and Peru) the constitution gives the national government power to legislate in all areas 
and to decide unilaterally what powers and fiscal resources it will delegate to SNGs. 
Consensus and political commitment to the rules are vital for their success. Rules 
with no broad social and political agreement are unlikely to be effectively 
implemented and in cases of major political volatility can easily end up being ignored. 
When fiscal credibility is low and institutions weak, not only may such rules be fiscally 
ineffective, but non‐enforcement may weaken yet further the fragile institutional 
context which made them so ineffective to begin with. Schmidt‐Hebbel (2010) found 
that a higher (lower) government surplus (deficit), higher government stability, a 
higher per capita GDP, a lower dependency ratio and countercyclical government 
spending raise the likelihood of adopting a fiscal rule. Additionally, such rules can 
contribute to stability and growth only if they are properly designed and they take into 
account country‐specific historical, cultural, political, and economic conditions (non‐
renewable resource endowment, fiscal decentralization, and other structural 
characteristics). 
Moreover, the political and social acceptability of a fiscal rule is also likely to be 
enhanced if they are included in fiscal responsibility laws. These laws extend the 
concept to rules of procedure that govern the fiscal policy‐making process and 
transparency rules that determine what fiscal information has to be made public and 
provide accountability mechanisms. Nonetheless, in this survey we will not use such 
                                                 
16
 See Ter‐Minassian and Jiménez (2011) for an analysis of fiscal decentralization in Latin America. 
17
 The pre‐conditions for effective market discipline are indeed demanding: i) credibility of no bailouts; 
ii) absence of privileged financing channels; iii) availability of reliable and timely information on 
government finances. They rarely are fully satisfied, even in advanced countries. 
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9 
broader definition of fiscal rules and we will focus on numerical rules, not procedural 
ones. 
The political costs of breaching the rule will also increase if an impartial body (an 
independent fiscal watchdog) is charged with overseeing its implementation (rather 
than making decisions) as it significantly reduces the risks of politically motivated 
manipulations of the rule. This is especially the case with rules like structural balance 
based ones, which involve complex and technically demanding calculations. Therefore, 
fiscal councils work as complements, rather than substitutes, to fiscal rules. In any 
case, even independent experts are susceptible to the bias of overestimating or 
underestimating potential growth or commodity prices. 
 
The Argentine fiscal rules18 
The first fiscal responsibility law in Argentina (Ley Nº 25,152 de Administración de 
los Recursos Públicos) was passed in 1999 and it became known to the public as the 
“fiscal convertibility law”. Following the impact of the Russian crisis and the Brazilian 
devaluation, Argentina was in recession, deflationary pressures were becoming more 
and more evident, and concern about the sustainability of the public accounts was 
spreading within and beyond the country. The strength of the convertibility system 
was called into question and the fiscal situation was seen as one of its weakest links. 
With an economy that had stopped growing and financing difficult to obtain, the 
government had to provide an assurance that it would adjust the accounts in future to 
whatever extent necessary. Passing Law Nº 25,152 was a way of doing this. The 
numerical rules of this law were set to follow a gradual deficit reduction timetable 
starting in 1999 and culminating with fiscal balance in 2003. Public spending growth 
was made conditional on GDP growth including the condition that primary spending 
could not be raised if economic activity declined. The fiscal rule followed a bottom‐up 
approach, inviting subnational governments (provinces) to pass their own fiscal 
responsibility legislation. A Fiscal Countercyclical Fund was also established, to be 
financed out of extraordinary concession and privatization receipts and a set 
percentage of tax revenues. It could accumulate resources up to a maximum of 3% of 
GDP, to be used during the recessionary phase of the economic cycle. The bill did not 
contain an escape clause that allowed numerical limits to be breached: the difficulty of 
raising public financing made it unthinkable for Argentina to increase its fiscal deficit as 
a countercyclical response to the recession affecting its economy. 
The results of Law Nº 25,152 were disappointing. It was promoted mainly to give 
positive signs overseas, fulfilling the commitments made with the IMF, get better 
credit ratings and restore credibility in the markets. But its implementation in the early 
2000s coincided with the doomed efforts to prevent the collapse of the convertibility 
regime, which was ultimately abandoned in late 2001 in the midst of a deep political, 
economic and social crisis. The deficit limits laid down in the law were modified in 
2000 (its first year of implementation) to provide for a longer period of convergence to 
fiscal balance and then disregarded. At the same time, SNGs were not covered by the 
                                                 
18
 Main sources for this section are Braun and Gadano (2007), IMF (2005) and Melamud (2010). 
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law, despite being responsible for a large share of the consolidated fiscal deficit. The 
Fiscal Countercyclical Fund was set up, but it never had the resources to operate in the 
way it was designed to. 
As a matter of fact, in the second half of 2001 (months before the political and 
economic crisis), the authorities tried to implement an extreme fiscal rule, far more 
ambitious in scope than the unenforced Law Nº 25,152. It was known publicly as the 
“zero deficit law” and formally enacted by a reform to financial administration Law Nº 
24,156. It was meant to apply a very simple principle: no more should be spent each 
month tan could be financed out of current public revenues. Although very simple in 
its conception, the law proved to be wholly impracticable. In fact, when the 
convertibility system collapsed, this law was ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme 
Court of Justice. The amendment establishing the zero deficit was removed from Law 
Nº 24,156 by an article in the 2003 budget act. 
After the crisis of late 2001 the Law Nº 25,152 remained formally in force but its 
prescriptions were not complied with or were suspended by articles included in the 
budget laws for each financial year (f.e., suspending payments into the Fiscal 
Countercyclical Fund). The scale of the problems that had to be resolved (suspension 
of payments on the public debt, rescheduling of bank deposits, the breaking of public 
service contracts, high unemployment) meant that complying with the rules approved 
by law in 1999 became a non‐priority issue to which few paid attention and so 
numerical targets were continuously breached since 1999. 
In 2004 Congress approved a new fiscal responsibility law (Ley Nº 25,917 
Régimen General de Responsabilidad Fiscal). Under this legislation, for the national 
government and the provinces which decided to be under the Law Nº 25,917 (21 out 
of 24 provinces in 2010): i) the variation in nominal current public spending cannot 
exceed the nominal GDP growth rate19 and capital expenditure growth may exceed the 
GDP increase in those jurisdictions that satisfy the debt indicator criterion or the 
nominal growth rates of resources (current and capital) exceed the nominal rate of 
growth of GDP; ii) the public debt service over current revenue (after deduction of 
revenue‐sharing transfers to municipalities) cannot be above 15% for provinces20 and 
the federal government public debt/GDP ratio has to be reduced in subsequent fiscal 
years (considering three‐year periods for the federal government); and, iii) all 
jurisdictions are required to balance revenue and expenditure, excluding investment in 
basic social and economic infrastructure (most capital spending) and current spending 
financed by international financial institutions and those provinces in which the debt 
criterion is not fulfilled (as set in ii)) should achieve a primary surplus. Additionally, all 
administrations are enjoined to create fiscal countercyclical funds.  
The vicissitudes of Argentina’s testing relationship with the IMF and the 
conditional financial assistance provided by the central government to the provinces 
strongly influenced the substance of Law Nº 25,917. The Argentine government in 
                                                 
19
 Except for periods of negative nominal GDP growth when nominal primary spending at most can stay 
constant. 
20
 In those cases which exceed the limit, five‐year plans that tend to locate within the parameters have 
to be designed. 
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2003 committed to send two bills to Congress in order to sign a 3‐year stand by 
agreement with the IMF: a revised tax revenue‐sharing (with the provinces) law and a 
new fiscal responsibility legislation. But the Executive only presented the bill for the 
fiscal responsibility law. However, the relationship between the national government 
and the provinces was an issue that permeated the contents of the law. 
The complex fiscal and financial relationship between the centre and the 
provinces, dominated by the delayed reform to the federal revenue‐sharing regime, 
was significantly affected by the crisis of 2001. Provinces in Argentina have strong 
constitutional rights. Expenditure is fairly decentralized, tax collection centralized and 
intergovernmental fiscal relations leave the federal government substantial discretion 
in assisting provinces in financial distress. A number of subnational administrations had 
increased their expenditure and borrowings too far during the boom period in the 
nineties and were having the utmost difficulty in adapting to a less favourable 
environment. As revenues and financing dried up, many administrations had resorted 
to issuing quasi‐currencies as the only way of meeting basic administrations costs, 
principally the salaries of public‐sector employees. By February 2002, the new national 
government had reached a fiscal agreement with the provinces that was designed to 
resolve the most critical aspects of the situation21. The debts of the provinces were 
assumed by the national government by means of a debt swap which converted 
foreign currency debts into peso‐denominated debts at an exchange rate of 1.4 
Argentine pesos per dollar. The new debt of the province to the national government 
had a lower net present value, a longer repayment period (16 years), a 3‐year grace 
period and a lower real interest rate (2%). In return for financial assistance from the 
federal government, some administrations in the greatest fiscal and financial 
difficulties undertook bilateral agreements with the centre known as ordered financing 
programmes (PFOs) to reduce their imbalances and to not increase their borrowings. 
As collateral of the loans, the provinces agreed to transfer their rights over federal 
revenue‐sharing resources to the national government. The agreements included 
penalties for non‐compliance by the provinces. 
The PFOs strongly influenced the contents of the Law Nº 25,917, which became a 
means to give greater institutional backing to these bilateral financing agreements 
between the national government and the provinces. This law followed a bottom‐up 
approach for subnational finances but was adopted by most of the provinces (21 out of 
24). The fiscal rules share with the PFOs the goal of capping the provinces’ public debt, 
and contain similar penalties for non‐compliance. But these penalties are rather vague 
and leave their specification to the internal charter of a fiscal watchdog (Consejo 
Federal de Responsabilidad Fiscal), which was created to oversee and coordinate the 
application of the law. Its members are representatives of the national and provincial 
governments and it is empowered to impose penalties for non‐compliance that ranges 
from public disclosure of any breaches to the partial withholding of budgetary 
transfers from the centre (other than revenue‐sharing resources), although the federal 
government has the power to veto any penalty. Also in the interests of fiscal 
transparency, this law established an obligation to prepare and publish standardized 
                                                 
21
 Acuerdo Nación-Provincias sobre Relación Financiera y Bases de un Régimen de Coparticipación 
Federal de Impuestos, signed on 27 February 2002 and ratified by Law Nº 25,570. 
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multiyear budgetary information for the national government and provinces. Each 
year, the national government was obliged to present a macrofiscal framework that 
would be used as an input for preparing the budget in all administrative districts. 
Regarding the record of the new law, as public revenues grew along with 
economic activity, Argentina improved significantly its fiscal accounts in recent years22. 
However, as seen in Table 2, the most important numerical rule of the new law 
(adjusted primary spending grew by more than GDP) has been met since 2007 thanks 
to the deduction of certain expenses from the current public spending: i) in 2007 and 
2008, public expenditures made in education to fulfill the goals of Article 2 of Law No. 
26,075 (increase of public investment in education); and, ii) in 2009, 2010 and 2011, 
Law Nº. 26,530 was passed to face the recent financial crisis allowing a more 
expansionary fiscal policy. In addition, Law Nº 26,124 (passed in August 2006) grants 
“emergency superpowers” to the President, leading to a virtual suspension of the fiscal 
rules and giving the government flexibility to allocate spending items within the 
budget. Lastly, the monitoring body established by law (Consejo Federal de 
Responsabilidad Fiscal) is not independent.  
In summary, institutional weakness where the executive amends laws with 
frequency and ease makes hard to imagine that a fiscal responsibility law might 
significantly constrain the decision‐making of those in government. Regarding 
provinces, many of them complied with some of the law’s procedural requirements, 
but some of them were not meeting the quantitative targets even before the onset of 
the global crisis in 2009. After this, a Programa Federal de Desendeudamiento (Decree 
Nº 60/2010) allowed a new restructuring of eligible provincial debts, affected by the 
deterioration of their fiscal balances. Eighteen provinces have benefited from such 
programs. 
Lastly, it is worth mentioning the Argentine GDP‐indexed bonds23. They were 
introduced in the context of its 2005 debt restructuring, as a mechanism which could 
play a complementary role in reducing the pressure to implement contractionary fiscal 
policies in downturns. These instruments are linked more closely with the 
requirements and the ability of the country to service its debt obligations. 
 
The Brazilian fiscal rule24 
Fiscal results in Brazil showed a significant deterioration after the Plan Real was 
adopted in 1994. This deterioration in fiscal performance was somewhat expected, 
since the drop in inflation meant the end of an important stabilizing factor of a 
balanced budget. The significant increase in discretionary spending and the increase in 
interest payments, resulting from high interest rates set by the central bank to 
maintain the strength of the exchange rate, also contributed to this deteriorating 
public finances. All these elements led to a significant expansion of the funding needs 
                                                 
22
 Argentina experienced a public debt default at the end of 2001 and a restructuring of the public debt 
in 2005 (with a large haircut) that substantially reduced debt service obligations in the period and which 
could give a misleading picture of the fiscal consolidation effort when viewed from the perspective of 
developments in the different measures of the fiscal deficit. 
23
 The Argentine government does not pay a certain coupon if GDP growth is below 3%. 
24
 The main source for this section is IMF (2009a) and the literature cited therein. 
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of the public sector and increased public debt, which was also increased by the cost of 
bank restructuring plans25. 
A broad effort to improve Brazilian public finances began in the mid 1990s. In 
particular, a subnational debt restructuring program was launched in 199726. As a 
result, the federal government entered into bilateral contracts with most states which 
included a program of fiscal adjustment and debt reduction in exchange for help with 
unsustainable subnational debt27. The contracts/programs proved to be key not only 
to achieve subnational fiscal consolidation (25 out of 27 signed the rescheduling 
agreement) 28, but also as an effective tool for fiscal coordination in the federation. 
In 1998, Brazil adopted a Fiscal Stabilization Program and reached an agreement 
with the IMF that sought to increase the primary surplus of federal and subnational 
entities (heavily based on tax increases), restructure debt, reform the budget process 
and promote a reform of the administration and social security. The adoption of a 
fiscal responsibility law in 2000 (Lei de Responsabilidade Fiscal e Finanças Publicas 
Municipais)29 was a key milestone. Being a complementary law (almost constitutional 
level), it requires a qualified majority (two‐thirds) for approval and modification, and it 
is binding for all entities of the public sector at all levels of government. It introduces 
the use of fiscal targets (primary surplus) and spending/debt limits. It does not specify 
quantitative targets or limits for all items, but requires that they are specified in 
separate legislation and regulations. Among them: 
• The target is defined in terms of the primary balance30, is expressed in levels in 
the annual Law on Budget Directives and is binding for the first year (although 
parliament can change it during the year). It must also include projections for the 
budget balance, expenditure and debt for the two following years and a description of 
fiscal risks with an assessment of contingent fiscal liabilities. 
• The ratio of net public debt‐to‐net revenues cannot exceed 3.5 for the federal 
government, 2 for states and 1.2 for municipalities. 
                                                 
25
 See Giambiagi and Ronci (2004) for an analysis of the evolution of fiscal policy during the Real Plan 
and thereafter. 
26
 Ley Nº 9.496 de 1997. The relation between the federal government and states are marked by a 
history of bailouts until the mid‐1990s. Major rescue operations by the federal government include 
bailouts in 1989, 1993 and 1994. Each initial agreement that tried to resolve a crisis actually made the 
next crisis more likely, because they reinforced the perception that the federal government would 
provide debt relief reducing the effectiveness of market discipline. See Bevilaqua (2000) for further 
discussion. 
27
 Federalism in Brazil revived in the 1980s with the return of democracy from military rule. The 1988 
constitution gave states significant authority and resources, including a much broader revenue base for 
the state‐level VAT, but did not specify their spending responsibilities or set rules for fiscal prudence. 
28
 The Federal Government assumed the state debts and refinanced it in 30 years with fixed 6% real 
interest rate. Each state was committed to a monthly payment up to an amount equivalent to 13 
percent of its net revenue. If the amount due exceeded this limit, the difference is capitalized to the 
debt stock. It was the first time that the bailout was followed by an explicit obligation on the part of the 
states to commit themselves to an agreed‐upon fiscal adjustment program, including a declining path 
for the state debt. 
29
 The Brazilian experience is also valuable for the public consultation process that spanned to a high 
degree of consensus. 
30
 The primary balance target was chosen at a time when securities paying floating interest rates and 
indexed to the exchange rate represented the bulk of traded public debt and, therefore, the debt‐to‐
GDP ratio was extremely sensitive to these variables. 
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• There are also specific limits on new spending and borrowing in the last year of 
a government. 
• There are maximum limits on personnel expenditure, as a proportion of net 
current revenues (federal: 50%, states: 60% and municipalities: 60%) and include both 
active and retired public servants. 
• Any new permanent expenditure has to be “affordable”: it cannot be created 
without reducing other expenditure or introducing new taxes. 
• The law strengthens the institutional fiscal framework of all areas of budget 
preparation, implementation and reporting (2‐monthly, 4‐monthly, annual). 
The law puts strong emphasis on procedural and transparency rules. It also 
includes procedures to monitor implementation of targets, corrective measures to be 
taken in case of any breaches and respective sanctions for all levels of government 
(including institutional and personal sanctions ‐fines, dismissal, prohibition to run for 
elections and even jail)31. The law includes flexibility clauses which are triggered by a 
significant deceleration in economic activity32 or a natural disaster but can only be 
invoked with Congressional approval. 
The law also places a series of restrictions on relations between public agencies 
and levels of government to prevent bail‐outs, monetization of deficits, and misuses of 
public financial institutions. In particular, it prohibits any new credit arrangement 
between entities of the public sector, as well as the direct deficit financing of any kind 
by the Central Bank. Furthermore, state‐owned financial institutions are prohibited to 
lend any money to their controlling agency. Despite provisions in the law, no 
institution is mandated to provide an independent view on the government’s 
proposed fiscal framework, policies, and macroeconomic assumptions. 
Fiscal performance in Brazil started to improve before the implementation of the 
Lei de Responsabilidade Fiscal e Finanças Publicas Municipais and remained strong 
after adopting it. As seen in Table 3 the fiscal targets were reached but expenditure 
growth in real terms picked up significantly since 2003 (stronger economic 
performance leading to higher tax collection contributed to reaching the targets). Net 
public debt (excluding the state‐owned utilities Petrobras and Electrobrás) declined 
steadily from its peak in 2002 of 60% of GDP to around 40% of GDP in 2010, but gross 
debt remains relatively high in comparison with other emerging economies. The 
composition of debt also changed during the period, with a reduction in the share of 
foreign currency debt (external public debt is well below FX reserves at the central 
bank), a lengthening in average maturity and a rise in the share of fixed‐rate 
instruments. In addition, the institutional framework required by the law has also 
improved reporting, accounting, and transparency (ample and more frequent 
reporting on fiscal developments and easier access by the public to fiscal data). 
Significant changes to the law have been introduced in recent years. A sovereign 
wealth fund was established in 2008 (Fundo Soberano do Brasil) to be used as a 
                                                 
31
 The Lei de Responsabilidade Fiscal e Finanças Publicas Municipais is supported by a Fiscal Crime Law. 
32
 Negative or economic growth below 1% in the previous four quarters let governments have a longer 
period to adjust to limits imposed by the law. 
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countercyclical instrument. The fund also aims at smoothing exchange rate volatility 
and promoting investment. So far, it has been used only to accumulate part of the 
fiscal overperformance in 2008 (0.5% of GDP injected in 2009). Incentives embodied in 
the fiscal framework do not seem to be sufficient to put money aside during good 
times. The fiscal target was also modified by the introduction of an investment 
adjustor, which allows the government to exclude part of the investment spending 
from the calculation of the target. An additional modification of the target resulted 
from the exclusion of Petrobas (the state oil company) from the fiscal targets starting 
in 2009. 
The international financial crisis in 2008‐09 put the fiscal framework to the test 
and Brazil was able to adopt countercyclical fiscal policy apart from the full operation 
of automatic stabilizers (mainly through temporary and targeted tax cuts and a 
reduction of the primary fiscal balance target). In addition, the government also 
started to give loans to public banks, which have been recorded as transactions in 
financial assets with no impact on the fiscal target (quasi‐fiscal operations). While the 
fiscal response to the crisis was effective, there was a weakening of fiscal transparency 
and the credibility of the fiscal framework may have suffered (uncertainty about the 
use of the investment adjustor, the exclusion of ad hoc expenditures or about how to 
account for sizeable policy lending). 
 
The Chilean fiscal rule33 
The adoption of a structural budget balance‐based rule was announced in May 
2000 by President Lagos, following intense technical preparations in the early months 
of his mandate. Chile’s fiscal rule seeks to insulate expenditure from cyclical 
fluctuations of real GDP growth and key mineral export prices. The adoption came at 
the end of a long period during which the public debt was reduced from 165% in 1985 
to 20% of GDP in 2000 and with the intention of solidifying and codifying the emerging 
fiscal discipline. The institutional coverage applied in the construction of the structural 
balance (not the primary structural balance) is the Central Government (excluding 
public enterprises, municipalities and public universities). 
In summary, the fiscal rule follows three steps. First, cyclically adjusted revenues 
(t) based upon trend growth and long‐term copper prices are estimated. Second, a 
target for the cyclically adjusted balance is set (b*). Third, government spending (g) is 
derived. Once a target is set for a year, the rule only allows the operation of automatic 
stabilizers. 
gt = tt –bt
*, with g, t and b* as percentages of GDP in a given year. 
All the variables and parameters used in the calculation of the structural balance 
were initially estimated by the Ministry of Finance, but within a year or so, with a view 
to strengthening the credibility of the estimates, the government appointed two 
panels of independent experts to set them (the trend GDP Committee and the 
Committee of the reference price of copper which offer values of fundamental 
parameters for the estimation of cyclically adjusted revenues). It also made changes in 
                                                 
33
 Main sources for this section are Caballero et al. (2011), Dabán (2011) and Ffrench‐Davis (2010). 
Berganza, Martín, Goenaga. Fiscalidad en América Latina.Economía… 
(IELAT‐  Septiembre 2012) 
   
 
Instituto de Estudios Latinoamericanos – Universidad de Alcalá      |      
 
16
response to the composition of public revenues, as adjusted for the molybdenum price 
(average of the last seven years since there are not a sufficient number of experts to 
set a committee) and private mining (which recorded a significant increase as a 
proportion of revenues). In addition, adjustments are made to public spending during 
the year, aimed at meeting the target ex post. 
The cyclically adjusted target for the central government was initially set at a 
surplus of 1% of GDP (from 2001 to 2007) in order to yield resources to recapitalize the 
central bank, lower the public debt‐to‐GDP ratio, accumulate financial assets, as 
counterpart to the ongoing gradual depletion of copper resources and prefinance 
contingent labour liabilities as well as social benefits (guaranteed minimum pensions 
and old‐age benefits). Having achieved these goals, the target was reduced to a surplus 
of 0.5% of GDP in 2008 and to balance in 2009 and 2010 to support the economy 
during the global crisis. In fact, there is no limit to the possibility of changing the 
target, not even any standard procedure to do so. 
Compliance with structural balance targets in Chile is not legally binding and the 
rule does not establish the path of return when there are deviations from the goal and 
does not provide penalties resulting from these deviations. However, successive 
governments have reiterated their commitment with set targets and mostly complied 
with them. The 2006 Ley Nº 20,128 sobre Responsabilidad Fiscal institutionalized key 
aspects of the structural balance rule framework (without forcing the government to 
commit to a specific target not specifying procedures for its calculation). This law also 
included the creation of the Fondo de Estabilización Económica y Social34 where overall 
fiscal surpluses are deposited and deficits can be financed from. Its value declined 
from a peak of $22.7 billion (13.3% of GDP) in 2008. This drop was the result of 
withdrawals of $9.4 billion (5.8% of GDP) in 2009 aimed at propping up growth without 
resorting to international assistance. This fund totalled $13.2 billion (5.4% of GDP) in 
December 2011. Another fund (the Fondo de Reserva de Pensiones with a pre‐specified 
range for annual deposits as a ratio to GDP) was also created to face pension liabilities 
in the future and totalled $4.4 billion (2.1% of GDP) in December 2011. Moreover, to 
prevent that the growth of both funds generated a domestic credit boom, the deposits 
were made offshore. A financial advisory committee (Comité Financiero) supervises 
both Funds as embedded in the 2006 law.  
Various analyses35 have found evidence that the Chilean structural balance rule 
together with the stabilitization fund have contributed significantly to reducing 
procyclicality, spending volatility, output volatility, interest rate volatility, appreciation 
of the real exchange rate in boom times and sovereign risk. The rule, while undergoing 
technical modifications over time, was met throughout the period in a situation of 
strong consensus and political support for the rule, but was somewhat eased in the 
last years before the financial crisis. Thus, during the period 2000‐05 the average 
growth of public spending was very close to GDP growth (4.4% and 4.3%, respectively). 
However, in the period 2006‐08 public spending shows an average increase of 8.1%, 
                                                 
34
 The Fondo de Estabilización Económica y Social received its first contribution on March 6, 2007, 
through a contribution of $2,580 million from the Fondo de Estabilización de los Ingresos del Cobre 
dated from 1981. 
35
 See Marcel (2010) and Frankel (2011) for details. 
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while GDP grew by only 4.3%. And the fiscal stimulus package announced in January 
2009 to underpin economic growth in the aftermath of the global financial crisis 
moved further away the structural outcome of the goal of 0%36 (see table 4). The rule 
requires only that fiscal policy be acyclical37 and the government went beyond this and 
undertook an active countercyclical policy to face the international crisis on a 
discretionary basis through relaxation of the target and methodological adjustments 
aimed at maximizing cyclically adjusted revenue (a de facto escape clause). This led to 
target underperformance, intertemporal inconsistency of the indicator and reduced 
transparency to calculate the structural balance (from adjusting two components in 
2001 to adjusting 12 in 2009). In turn, it eroded the rule credibility38, put significant 
strain on the rule‐based fiscal framework and brought to the fore some shortcomings 
of the fiscal rule (among them, no sanctions when the realized budget differs). 
As a result, seeking to address some shortcomings of the rule and the fallout 
from the global crisis, an ad hoc high‐level technical advisory committee to the 
Ministry of Finance (the Corbo Commission) has released recommendations to improve 
and simplify the methodologies used to calculate the structural balance, and increase 
the transparency and accountability of the fiscal rule. Authorities have yet to decide 
which they will adopt and when (although some of them are expected to be put in 
place starting in 2012). Some of the recommendations for the rule upgrading are39: 
• Inclusion of a countercyclical factor (a discretionary action), as the fiscal rule 
based on a structural budget balance is acyclical. The fiscal target as a percentage of 
GDP in a given year (b*) would consist in that case of the cyclically neutral target, to be 
set at the beginning of the four‐year presidential term, plus a countercyclical 
component. This countercyclical component is to be activated by a predetermined 
negative output gap and would be subject to two constraints: i) take the form of 
nonpermanent expenditure changes and/or temporary tax adjustments easily 
reversible; and, ii) a ceiling of 0.5% of GDP per annum. 
• Escape clauses: Target compliance can be temporarily suspended in the event 
of a significant shock (natural catastrophes, military conflicts or major economic crisis). 
Post‐crisis convergence to the target is to be gradual, but it should not exceed three 
years in order to maintain intertemporal fiscal strength. 
• Primary spending should be the basis for the fiscal rule. This would insulate the 
cyclically adjusted balance from interest rate changes and procyclical bias of revenue 
coming from rule‐based asset accumulation (return on accrued financial assets may 
not be in line with the long‐term interest rates). 
                                                 
36
 The public sector size, measured as the ratio government expenditure‐to‐GDP, rose consistently from 
18.1% in 2006 to near 25% in 2009. 
37
 There is a terminological question regarding this issue: do automatic stabilizers constitute 
countercyclical fiscal policy? 
38
 In 2009 conceptual changes were also introduced relative to transition from a balance in which only 
the cyclical effects were adjusted to a balance in which the revenues adjustment was intended to follow 
a kind of permanent income concept (transitory taxes, changes in the elasticity of non‐mining taxes, 
change in the methodology for estimating long‐term price of molybdenum and incorporation of cyclical 
adjustment for the effect of interest income on financial assets). 
39
 See Caballero et al. (2011). 
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• Copper price smoothing: The impact of sharp changes in the estimated long 
term copper price on cyclically adjusted revenue and, therefore, on spending should 
be smoothened by either adjusting the fiscal target or estimating its trend price. 
• Ex post target compliance: midyear monitoring and correction of cyclically 
adjusted balance deviations from its target. This requirement would be mandated by 
law. 
• Exclusion of transitory fiscal provisions. The cyclically adjusted balance would 
exclude the impact of temporary fiscal measures such as tax hikes or reductions. This 
would prevent financing permanent spending with transitory revenue. 
• Elimination of the cyclical correction on the return on accrued financial assets. 
• Establishment of an independent fiscal council to evaluate the fiscal rule 
methodology, provide assumptions and projections for variables required to calculate 
the cyclical adjustment, assess medium‐term and long‐term sustainability, evaluate 
cases when exit clauses are invoked, etc. 
After incorporating the recommendations on the methodology of estimating the 
structural balance presented by the advisory committee in its report, there was a 
reassessment of the results of structural balance which are shown in table 4. Given 
these changes, the structural deficit as a percentage of GDP for 2009 was reestimated 
from 1.1% to 3%. Additionally, after the earthquake and tsunami of February 2010, the 
Piñera administration, to finance the substantial cost of reconstruction (4.2% of GDP), 
opted for a package of temporary and permanent increases in taxes and spending 
reallocations and announced that it could not commit to restoring balance to the 
structural fiscal result by the end of its time in office. As a consequence, the new 
government proposed a goal of convergence of the structural deficit to 1% of GDP in 
2014, reducing the structural deficit each year. 
The Colombian fiscal rules40 
The Colombian 1991 Constitution states that the country is a state organized in 
the form of a single, decentralized Republic with autonomous subnational divisions. 
The Nation is required to transfer funds to SNGs to finance education, health, potable 
water and other general purpose services. These funds are very rigid and cannot be 
used to cover any debt. Another important transfer comes from the royalties from the 
extraction of nonrenewable resources. Apart from it, SNGs are free to regulate taxes 
tied to consumption, property taxes and fines and penalties. 
Colombia’s early fiscal rules were applicable only to SNGs and aimed to 
strengthen central government’s control over subnational debt, within the context of 
increasing political decentralization. The first law (Ley Nº 358 de Semáforos) was 
passed in 1997. It introduced a rating system for territorial governments to show 
solvency and sustainability based on debt indicators, banning borrowing (nationally or 
internationally) for highly indebted local governments through financial institutions or 
through the capital market (red light) and requiring authorization from the Ministry of 
Finance for intermediate cases (yellow light). The entities with poor ratings were 
required to implement fiscal stabilization plans. The law was not effective and many 
red light local governments were able to incur new debt, including by presenting 
                                                 
40
 Main sources for this section are Lozano et al. (2008) and Comité Técnico Interinstitucional (2010). 
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defective financial information. Subnational debt still grew by 15 percent a year in 
1998‐2000. A new law (Ley Nº 617 de Responsabilidad Fiscal Territorial) was passed in 
2000 and established a set of rules for SNGs, limiting operating expenditures based on 
the entity’s freely disposable revenues, and also requiring fiscal adjustment plans in 
case of noncompliance with the laws, to be monitored by the Ministry of Finance. 
A law applicable to all levels of government (Ley Nº 819 de Responsabilidad 
Fiscal) was passed in 200341, containing both procedural and numerical rules. Before 
June 15 each year, the National Government has to present to the Economic 
Commissions of the Senate and the House of Representatives, a Medium Term Fiscal 
Framework, which will be studied and discussed during the first debate of the Law 
annual Budget. This report states fiscal and macroeconomic objectives. On numerical 
rules, the law requires that fiscal management at all levels of government be 
consistent with debt sustainability. Each year the central government determines a 
primary surplus target for the next year for the nonfinancial public sector (NFPS) and 
indicative targets for the primary surplus of the ten following years and the 
corresponding debt trajectory42. This target will be approved by the Consejo Nacional 
de Política Económica y Social, CONPES, upon advice of Consejo Superior de Política 
Fiscal, CONFIS. The report must include, in case of failure to meet targets set in the 
Medium Term Fiscal Framework last year, an explanation of any deviation from the 
goals and steps to correct them in a way that the sustainability of public debt is 
ensured. Table 5 shows the NFPS primary surplus targets for the next year as set in the 
Medium Term Fiscal Framework report and its realization since 2005. 
Ley Nº 819 de Responsabilidad Fiscal also reinforces the indicators established in 
previous legislation (e.g., ceilings on debt service, the ratio of debt stock to current 
revenues, debt stock, and expenditures). SNGs may take out loans if they meet certain 
criteria in terms of amount of indebtedness, term, and method of payment, among 
other things. Noncomplying entities are required to implement fiscal adjustment plans 
and official guarantees for debt refinancing purposes apply only to SNGs undergoing 
these adjustment plans. Personal sanctions for public officials also apply according to 
the Disciplinary Law. The law fosters market enforcement mechanisms by applying 
bankruptcy procedures to municipalities (Ley Nº 550 of 1999) and requiring main 
municipalities and departments to obtain credit ratings from private companies. All 
the debt regulations for SNGs were put in place when overall credit metrics were 
highly stressed for them. Today’s financial discipline has considerably improved as 
local governments have posted surpluses since 2001. However, the deficit of the 
central government has remained large. 
In 2011 constitutional amendments were approved in Congress. It included: i) the 
incorporation of the criterion of fiscal sustainability in the Constitution (articles 334, 
339 and 346); ii) a more efficient management of the royalties43; and, iii) the adoption 
                                                 
41
 This law was complemented by Decreto 4730 in 2005. 
42
 The primary surplus targets, on average, may not be less than the structural primary surplus which 
ensures the sustainability of debt. 
43
 The reform on royalties (articles 360 and 361 of the Constitution) means that resources from that 
source will focus on science and technology, retirement savings, regional development projects, physical 
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of a fiscal rule on central government finances (Ley Nº 1,473). This fiscal rule is 
modelled on the Chilean one and specific regulations are being developed44. The aim is 
to ensure fiscal discipline, enhance countercyclical fiscal policy, and improve the 
management of commodity revenues. As of 2014, fiscal policy will be guided for the 
achievement of cyclically adjusted balance target (b*) of the central government45 
according to the following expression (variables are defined as percentages of GDP): 
bt = b
* + α yt + ccipt, 
where b is primary fiscal balance , b* is the targeted structural primary balance 
(primary balance adjusted for economic, commodity cycles and extraordinary items); y 
is the output gap (as a % of potencial GDP) and ccip represents the excess oil revenues 
(from either higher than expected oil prices or production above a determined 
baseline) generated by Ecopetrol, the national oil company, and from other minerals. 
Spending by the central government will be, therefore, a function of trend real GDP 
growth and the long‐term oil and other mineral prices. The targeted primary structural 
deficits (b*) are no higher than 1% of GDP from 2022 onwards with a transitory period 
(lower than 2.3% in 2014 and lower than 1.9% in 2018). They are determined by the 
primary balances which allow to reduce public debt from 45% of GDP in 2011 to below 
30% by 2020 (level of debt consistent with an investment grade according to 
international evidence for emerging countries). Related to this proposal, while it 
appears to make sense to delay a fiscal adjustment until economic recovery is better 
rooted, the bulk of the effort is reserved for the second half of the decade. This raises 
uncertainties about shifting political or economic winds in the coming years. The 
parameter α is defined as the sensitivity of fiscal balance to the output gap and aims to 
combine two elements: a countercyclical fiscal policy (0.18) and automatic stabilizers 
(0.12). Therefore, the value of α is 0.3, which means that the primary balance can 
deviate from its goal (b*) in 0.3% of GDP for each point of the output gap. 
Taking another cue from Chile, excess oil revenues would be used to prepay debt 
and to capitalize a sovereign wealth fund (Fondo de Ahorro y Estabilización Fiscal y 
Macroeconómica) managed by the central bank. The approved legislation on fiscal rule 
also includes escape clauses46 to cope with large exogenous shocks which could 
jeopardize the macroeconomic stability of the country and the setting up of a council 
of independent experts (Comité Externo para la Evaluación de la Regla Fiscal) to advise 
the government on technical issues and to verify the fulfillment of the fiscal rule every 
                                                                                                                                               
investments in education and public savings. The administration of such resources will be carried out by 
territorial entities and will be overseen by the central Government. 
44
 Rulemaking of various matters is still pending, including the definition of structural deficit, counter‐
cyclical expenditure, and exceptions to compliance to the fiscal rule.  
45
 The authorities opted for a fiscal rule focused on the central government on the grounds that it was 
preferable to define targets on variables that were under the direct control of the government in spite 
of the fact that if the fiscal rule had covered the consolidated public sector the overall debt target had 
been better anchored. 
46
 Countercyclical fiscal stimulus is permitted if the projected growth rate falls at least two percentage 
points below the long‐term growth rate and the output gap is negative. The fiscal stimulus has to be 
below 20% of the estimated negative output gap and will be transitory as it has to be dismantled 
completely over a period of two years, with a requirement that in the first year of that period the 
economy should register an economic growth rate equal to or greater than its real economic growth in 
the long run. 
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year. And the rule contemplates a notional or control account, which records the 
deviations between the results at year's end and the target. When the accumulated 
notional account reaches ‐0.5% of GDP, the government must set goals in the next two 
years (0.3% of GDP in the first year and 0.2% of GDP in the second) to correct it. If the 
difference exceeds this limit, it must be fully corrected in the following year, in 
addition to the adjustment already planned. 
 
The Mexican fiscal rule47 
The Ley Federal de Presupuesto y Responsabilidad Hacendaria was adopted in 
2006. Apart from requiring the government to present the annual budget in the 
context of a medium‐term framework with projections covering the subsequent five 
years, the law established a zero fiscal target for the “traditional” public sector balance 
(which includes the federal government, two social security systems and some public 
enterprises ‐including the national company PEMEX‐ but excludes state and local 
governments), mechanisms for budgeting under oil price uncertainty and a system of 
oil funds. Oil plays a very important role in the public finances as oil‐related revenue 
accounts for 30‐40 percent of total revenue. As the rule targets a cash balance, the 
rule excludes accruals registered under long‐term contracts to develop and manage 
infraestructure projects (PIDIREGAS), the impact on the fiscal balance of state owned 
development banks, etc. (the so‐called “augmented” balance). Therefore, the rule for 
the so‐called “traditional” balance can be written when designing the budget as 
G – T (P*, Y*) = 0, 
where G = public sector expenditure; T = public sector revenue; P* = oil price 
parameter in the budget which for each year is projected using a reference oil price, 
with a weight of ¾ being given to oil futures prices and a weight of ¼ to the average oil 
price of the last 10 years; and, Y* = expected output. So that when extra revenues (ER) 
are observed (from oil prices being higher than the reference price and/or observed 
output being higher than expected output), 
G – T (P*, Y*) –ER (P-P*, Y-Y*)= 0, 
they may first be used to compensate for certain nonprogrammable budget 
overruns (natural disasters, f.e.). The remainder is split among 4 first‐tier funds48 (oil, 
pensions’ restructuring, PEMEX and investment by federal entities). Once the first tier 
reserve funds reached their statutory ceilings (totaling about 1.5% of GDP), any 
subsequent excesses were to be allocated to a second tier of funds that finance 
investment by subnational governments (50%), PEMEX investment (25%), and a fund 
to finance future costs of pension reform (25%). If over the course of a fiscal year 
expected revenue does not meet projections (f.e., actual oil revenues turn out to be 
lower than budgeted due to lower oil prices or exchange rate effects), the government 
                                                 
47
 The main source for this section is IMF (2010b). 
48
 Mexico implemented an oil stabilizations fund in 2000. A part of government revenues in excess of 
budgeted amounts was to be transferred to the fund. At first, fund resources could only be used if oil 
export revenues fell by more than US$1.5 a barrel below the reference oil price in the budget. In 2002, 
the rules were changed to allow for full compensation of shortfalls. During that year the fund’s 
accumulated resources were fully drawn. 
Berganza, Martín, Goenaga. Fiscalidad en América Latina.Economía… 
(IELAT‐  Septiembre 2012) 
   
 
Instituto de Estudios Latinoamericanos – Universidad de Alcalá      |      
 
22
can cut expenditures to balance the budget or the stabilization funds may make 
transfers to the budget to cover the shortfalls. However, since the law placed a cap on 
the saving of excess revenues, by the end of 2008 these funds amounted to 1.8% of 
GDP, despite an unprecedented boom in oil prices. Without this ceiling on savings, the 
authorities would have had greater capacity to pursue countercyclical policies during 
the crisis. In any case, by December 2011 the funds contained the equivalent of just 
0.3% of GDP in assets as the authorities paid for the oil hedge49, increased PEMEX 
investment and diverted money to infrastructure spending. 
Important developments concerning the fiscal framework took place in 2008‐10, 
at a time when the Mexican economy was hit by the global financial crisis. Fiscal 
stimulus measures were adopted between 2008 and 2009 amounting to 2.5% of GDP 
(increased transfers to low income families and communities, increase in public 
investment, and injection of additional credit, channeled primarily through the state‐
owned development banking system, with priority to small and medium‐sized 
enterprises). But this countercyclical easing in the midst of a deep recession of the 
Mexican economy was only possible because some decisions were adopted concerning 
the Ley Federal de Presupuesto y Responsabilidad Hacendaria. In October 2008 the law 
was adapted such that from 2009 PEMEX will no longer make investments through the 
scheme known as PIDIREGAS which was out of the “traditional” balance. But the target 
for the “traditional” rule embedded in the fiscal rule excluded the PEMEX investment. 
The congress also approved a modification of the balanced budget target of the Fiscal 
Responsibility Law50, which as can be seen in Table 6 eased the fiscal stance by about 
0.6 percent of GDP in 2009. Exceptional circumstances were also invoked in the 
budgets of 2010 and 2011 to maintain moderate fiscal deficits in those years. In late 
2009 and early 2010 in a bid to strengthen the sustainability of fiscal policy in the 
medium term and with the first signs of domestic economic recovery, the authorities 
adopted a package of fiscal measures to reduce the public deficit gradually. 
Also in 2010 the caps on the accumulated resources in some of the funds were 
waived temporarily for 2010 and 2011, with the intention of ultimately removing them 
permanently in the fiscal rule. This would make the fiscal position more symmetric 
over the business cycle. At the end of 2011 the stabilization funds had accumulated 
0.8% of GDP. 
The Mexican a priori balanced budget rule is pro‐cyclical as it implies high public 
spending when economic activity and revenues are buoyant, and spending restraint 
when economic activity and revenues are weak. Many analysts also suggest that the 
government should consider accumulating a buffer of financial assets not only during 
economic upturns but over the business cycles as a whole to reduce this cyclical 
vulnerability of the public finances and increase the authorities' capacity to counter 
the impacts of negative shocks on public revenues. Additionally, the balance budget is 
                                                 
49
 In the last years the Mexican government has limited revenue volatility by hedging oil revenues 
against declines by buying put options on financial markets. The put options provide the government 
with an oil price similar to that in the budget, even when oil prices fall well below the budgeted price as 
during 2009. 
50
 This requires explicit justification on the part of the legislative branch and must provide a plan for 
returning to zero balance. 
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done on a year‐by‐year basis and lacks a broader medium term outlook of three to five 
years. Apart from these needs, the Mexican sustainability of fiscal policy faces two 
major structural problems: (i) the decline in oil production which has been offset by 
the significant increase in oil prices; and, (ii) the low rate of non‐oil taxation as the 
domestic tax burden is well below that of countries at similar levels of development51. 
 
The Peruvian fiscal rules52 
Fiscal performance in Peru improved up until the mid‐1990s, with the overall 
balance of the nonfinancial public sector reaching a surplus in 1997. However, fiscal 
performance deteriorated in the following years: the overall surplus achieved in 1997 
had turned into a deficit of 3 percent of GDP by 1999, with public debt rising to nearly 
50 percent of GDP. Therefore, as a permanent institutional device to promote fiscal 
discipline in a credible, predictable, and transparent manner Ley Nº 27,245 de 
Prudencia y Transparencia Fiscal was enacted in December 1999 and came into effect 
in 2000. 
The law contained both procedural and numerical rules. The numerical rule 
includes caps on the public balance and on the real current expenditure for the 
nonfinancial public sector and general government, respectively. It allowed for an 
overall non financial public sector deficit of up to 1% of GDP from 2002 (the deficit 
ceilings for 2000‐02 featured a declining path, from 2% of GDP in 2000 to 1% of GDP in 
2002), while capping the increase in real nonfinancial expenditures of the general 
government to 2%, using the GDP deflator to calculate the nominal increase. Also 
during the first seven months of an election year, nonfinancial expenditure of the 
general government cannot exceed 60 percent of the budgeted annual amount; and 
the fiscal deficit of the nonfinancial public sector in the first semester of an election 
year cannot exceed 50 percent of the budgeted annual deficit to prevent outgoing 
administrations from engineering an opportunistic fiscal expansion. Sanctions are only 
institutional. There are no specific individual sanctions, but officials must comply with 
the fiscal rule according to the rules and principles of the Law on Ethics of Public 
Service. The law also included an escape clause that allowed for a temporary (one 
year) relaxation of the target in case of national emergency or international crisis. It 
had to be approved by Congress at the request of the Executive. Moreover, when 
there was sufficient evidence (with a report from the Minister of Economy and 
Finance) that the GDP was declining or could decline in the following fiscal year, the 
deficit target could be missed (never exceeding two per cent of GDP). 
The Ley Nº 27,245 was partially modified in 2003 (Ley Nº 27,958 de 
Responsabilidad y Transparencia Fiscal) with a clear objective of debt consolidation 
due to the fact that in 2002‐03 regional governments were created and obtained 
substantial fiscal autonomy, including the right to borrow53. The national government 
                                                 
51
 In the last 20 years non‐oil revenues averaged just fewer than 10% of GDP. 
52
 The main sources for this section are IMF (2010a) and IMF (2012). 
53
 Decentralization came relatively late to Peru, as part of a democratic reaction after Fujimori’s exit in 
2001. The 2002 decentralization law foresaw having half or more of public sector spending managed 
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transferred important responsibilities and fiscal resources to regional governments 
and reinforced the existing local (municipal) governments. In fact, both levels of 
subnational governments doubled their budget revenues in only five years. However, 
they are mostly financed by national government transfers instead of own collected 
taxes. The fiscal rules applicable to SNGs are established in the Legislative Decree Nº 
955 (Ley de Descentralización Fiscal) in 2004: i) the relationship between the annual 
total debt stock and the current revenue of regional and local governments should not 
exceed 100 percent; ii) the ratio of annual debt service to current income must be 
below 25 percent; and, iii) the moving average of the primary outcome of three years 
must show a positive value for each regional and local governments. The fiscal rule 
also provides that failure of fiscal rules in the regional and local governments restrict 
access to intergovernmental funds54 and that the government through Emergency 
Decree can adopt fiscal measures aimed at stabilizing public finances of these entities. 
SNGs need the central government’s guarantee to contract external debt, which must 
be allocated to finance infrastructure. However, there have been high and increasing 
rates of non‐compliance at the subnational level and no SNG has received sanctions. 
This is probably due to the fact that the subnational public finances in Peru never 
deteriorated to the point where it adversely affected the country’s financial sector or 
macroeconomic stability. 
Further changes in the Ley Nº 27,958 were: i) the cap to the increase in real 
nonfinancial expenditures of the general government was raised from 2% to 3%; ii) the 
budgeted fiscal deficit of the nonfinancial public sector in the first semester of an 
election year cannot exceed 40 percent of the budgeted annual deficit instead of 50 
percent as in the 1999 law; and, iii) some modifications in the escape clause (extension 
up to three years and a new numerical ceiling of 2.5 per cent of GDP for the deficit). 
More procedural (fiscal transparency provisions) and numerical changes were 
introduced in 2007 (Ley Nº 29,035) and 2008 (Ley Nº 29,144). In 2007 the coverage of 
expenditure under the rule was narrowed from nonfinancial expenditure to 
consumption expenditure of the central government (wages and salaries, goods and 
services, and pensions)55 and this expenditure was deflated by the inflation target of 
the central bank to calculate its real change. 
Regarding the assessment of the fiscal rule, as seen in Table 7, compliance with 
the deficit limits in 2000‐02 proved problematic and following repeated breaches, the 
target was loosened in 2003, when a new sliding scale for the deficit was put in place, 
from 2% of GDP in 2003 to 1% of GDP in 2005 and thereafter. The compliance 
improved significantly since 2003 as mineral and other revenues boomed, and the 
limits were met with growing margins until 2008. On the contrary, the expenditure 
rule, in addition to undergoing several modifications56, did not provide a binding 
                                                                                                                                               
and to some extent allocated by SNGs, compared to the previous situation where SNGs managed less 
than 10 per cent of public spending. 
54
 The National Decentralization Council can deny access for 90 days to conditional transfers to regions 
not complying with the fiscal rules during two consecutive years.  
55
 Thus, investment spending and expenditure of the local and regional governments were excluded 
from the spending rule. 
56
 Changes include not only the use of different deflators and targets for real growth rates, but also the 
transactional coverage to use the cap (from current spending to consumption expenditure). 
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constraint during the upswing as the fiscal rule and did not help anchor the fiscal policy 
formulation process and moderate procyclicality. In any case, due to the booming of 
revenues, the Peruvian government reduced its debt on the upside (the public sector 
gross debt was reduced from 44 percent of GDP in 2004 to 24 in 2010) 57. 
The global financial crisis put pressure on the fiscal rules. In May 2009 Congress 
approved the waiver presented by the Executive soliciting the relaxation of the fiscal 
rule to allow for a deficit of 2% of GDP in 2009‐10 (returning to the 1% limit in 2011) 
and the relaxation of the expenditure rule (to a yearly real change of 4%). In fact, the 
government passed a significant countercyclical fiscal stimulus (3.5% of GDP) as a 
policy response to the crisis: central government’s consumption expenditure was 
allowed to grow 10% in 2009 and 8% in 2010, beyond the limits imposed by the fiscal 
rules, and capital expenditure increased by more than 35% in both years. In fact, the 
Peruvian fiscal rule that combines deficit and current expenditure ceilings seems to be 
well suited to favour public infrastructure investment, key to close the significant 
infrastructure gaps of the region (see Carranza et al., 2011). There were, however, low 
execution rates of capital spending as they are mainly made at the subnational level. 
The fiscal rule also created a fiscal stabilization fund to mitigate cyclical 
variations. The Fondo de Estabilización Fiscal (FEF) accumulates income from the fiscal 
surplus at the end of the year (if current income from ordinary resources exceeded its 
three previous year’s average in 0.3% of GDP), 10% of net income from each sale of 
assets for privatization, 10% of down payments by state concessions and 30% of funds 
raised by new royalties for the exploitation of nonrenewable natural resources owned 
by the state, in addition to interest from deposits in the FEF. The stabilization fund may 
not exceed 4% of GDP. The resources exceeding this limit will be used for debt 
reduction or will go to the Fondo Consolidado de Reservas Previsionales. FEF resources 
may only be used when revenues are at least 0.3 percent of GDP lower than the 
average ratio of the last 3 years and GDP declines in two consecutive quarters. 
However, no more than 40 percent of total funds can be used in a given year, except 
when the escape clauses apply. At the end of 2009 it had accumulated 1.4% of GDP 
and it was not used during the financial crisis because discretion regarding the timing 
of inflows to the FEF allowed the government to apply the 2008 surplus to the 
stimulus. On 31 March Emergency Decree Nº 012-2011 was passed to achieve the 
objective of increasing the FEF, which amounted to $5.63 billion (3.2% of GDP) at the 
end of 2011. 
The Venezuelan fiscal rules58 
Venezuela’ history with oil funds goes back a long way. In the mid 1970s 
following the first oil price boom, the Fondo de Inversión de Venezuela (FIV) was 
created. The objective of the fund was to help save a significant share of the oil 
windfall. In the event, part of the fund’s resources was soon diverted to financing 
domestic investments and taking equity in public enterprises that subsequently turned 
out to be loss makers. Thus, while Venezuela’s oil exports surged from US$3 billion in 
                                                 
57
 Similarly, a sound debt management strategy successfully reduced debt vulnerabilities in terms of 
currency and interest rate risks. 
58
 The main source for this section is IMF (2010c). 
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1972 to US$20 billion in 1981, during the period the FIV saved only US$2.5 billion at 
the central bank. In the 1990s, some of the fund’s remaining resources were used to 
support loss‐making state companies in the electricity sector – in effect, energy 
subsidies were provided off budget through the use of the FIV’s resources. 
Between 1998 and 2000 a new framework to help manage oil resources was put 
in place. First, an organic budget law was approved in 2000. The law was intended to 
strengthen fiscal policy and reduce public expenditure volatility – a chronic problem in 
Venezuela. It focused on improving the budget process, including the use of a 
multiyear framework, and introduced multiyear numerical fiscal rules for the current 
balance, expenditure growth, and the public debt. Implementation of the law, 
however, was postponed. In 1998, an oil stabilization fund, the Fondo de Inversión 
para la Estabilización Macroeconómica (FIEM) was created. The objectives of the fund 
were to help insulate the budget and the economy from fluctuations in oil prices. As 
initially designed in late 1998, contributions to the fund were specified as the oil 
revenues above a reference value corresponding to a five year moving average. 
Resources could only be drawn from the fund in a given year if oil revenues were 
below the reference value or resources in the fund exceeded 80 percent of the moving 
average of oil export revenues, in which case resources could be used to amortize 
public debt. The rules of the FIEM were substantially modified in 1999. The reference 
values triggering accumulation or withdrawal of resources were fixed at US$9 a barrel. 
Fifty percent of any oil revenues that accrued at a price above this value were to be 
deposited by the central government, the regional governments and PDVSA (the state 
oil company) in the FIEM. Discretionary withdrawals from the fund with government 
authorization and legislative approval were allowed. In 2001 the FIEM was modified 
again, and the government and PDVSA were exempted from the requirement to make 
deposits for a while. Many further changes were introduced in subsequent years in the 
context of the annual budgets. In 2004 the Fondo de Estabilización Macroeconómica 
(FEM) was set up to replace the FIEM and it did not accumulate any significant 
resources during 2005‐08 when oil prices surged. Therefore, rules about this fund were 
frequently changed, ignored, or the operation of the fund was temporarily suspended. 
In fact, the oil fund mostly integrated with overall fiscal policy. Even at times, the 
required deposits could only be made in the fund by taking on public debt. It is not 
strange that according to the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute (2010), the Venezuelan 
FEM was given a very negative grade in terms of transparency (just 1 out of 10). 
In summary, the organic budget law and the FIEM/FEM were put in place with 
the objective of improving fiscal performance and smoothing expenditure. 
Nonetheless, they did not achieve this purpose as they did not prevent the 
implementation of highly procyclical fiscal policies. During the boom and in a situation 
of abundant liquidity generated by resource revenues, a number of rules targeting the 
nonresource balance and the rate of growth of expenditure were tested by mounting 
expenditure pressures. These pressures may have been based in part on growing 
perceptions as time went by that the resource price increases were “permanent.” As a 
result, the rules were not implemented. 
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Assessment of fiscal rules in Latin America 
The role of numerical fiscal rules and stabilization funds in both short run 
stabilization and the promotion of longer term sustainability have gained increased 
emphasis in policy and academic debates. In theory, well designed and effectively 
implemented fiscal rules, although second best policies, can help reduce time 
inconsistency in budgetary policies, strengthen the credibility of a government’s 
commitment to fiscal sustainability, and facilitate countercyclical fiscal management. 
However, these effects are difficult to test empirically. The rules and funds have been 
in place for just a few years and there are sample selection and identification problems 
as fiscal rules in some countries are part of a broader rules‐based macroeconomic 
policy framework. Additionally, many governments have violated their fiscal rules. 
Hence, it would be very useful to have data on the facto rules (an index of 
enforcement of the jure rules) to improve the model’s explanatory power. Lastly, in 
addition to fiscal rules, two other important factors that can explain the improvement 
of the fiscal policy behaviour are the learning‐by‐doing effect from the previous boom 
and the quality of policymakers. But they are very difficult to measure. 
Several studies have found correlation between the existence of fiscal rules and 
the fiscal performance. Manasse (2006), in a sample of 49 countries, modelled fiscal 
rule as a dummy variable to explain the primary deficit and found that fiscal policy is 
weakly procyclical and that the presence of a fiscal rule makes it more countercyclical. 
But it is difficult to establish causality due to an endogeneity bias (once the quality of 
institutions is accounted for it could be the case that fiscal rules do not significantly 
affect policy)59: it is more likely that virtuous countries/governments put in place fiscal 
frameworks that are conducive to fiscal sustainability and to a correct policy response 
to the cycle, rather than being such frameworks that make countries/governments 
more virtuous. Dos Reis and Guerson (2006) tried to shed some light on this by 
simulating a structural balance expenditure rule for five Latin American countries using 
a vector autoregression (VAR) framework. They found that if expenditure were set at a 
fixed percentage of long run (structural) government revenue, the volatility of output 
would always be lower. Caceres et al. (2010), using structural breaks in the level or 
variance of the primary fiscal balance, find limited empirical evidence in support of the 
view that fiscal rules have had a distinguishable effect on fiscal performance60. And 
Thornton (2009) concludes that fiscal rules have not contributed to improvements in 
fiscal outcomes in emerging markets61. 
With respect to the aim of strengthening the long term sustainability (reducing 
the deficit bias and controlling the growth in public debt) in Latin America, Daude et al. 
                                                 
59
 See Frankel et al. (2011). 
60
 They find that fiscal rules may have helped anchor efforts to strengthen fiscal policy, but do not seem 
to have been the driver of such efforts. There are nine countries in their sample. Five of them 
(Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru) are from Latin America.  
61
 The empirical approach relies on “differences‐in‐differences” estimation and assumes an arbitrary 
“treatment date” for the control group in the sample. As discussed in this paper, the correct selection of 
break dates is critical to avoid estimation bias. Emerging market economies that did not adopt fiscal 
rules also experienced improvements in their fiscal performance around the same time as the 
economies which adopted them. 
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(2011) found that sustainability had recently improved (all the countries except 
Argentina were able during the last decade to exhibit fiscal balances above those 
required to sustain their current debt levels). 
Regarding the short term stabilization aim, IMF (2011a) points out that after 
adopting the rules, fiscal policy was broadly procyclical as real expenditures expanded 
well above the rate of potential economic growth. A different and more common way 
to measure the fiscal stance is through the fiscal impulse, defined as the change in the 
structural primary balance62. In figure 1, these fiscal impulses are compared with the 
cyclical position of the economy for six Latin American countries in the period 1992‐
200963. The chart can be read as follows: the upper right‐hand quadrant (an increase in 
the structural balance ‐ a positive fiscal impulse‐ at a time of economic upturn) and the 
lower left‐hand quadrant (decrease in the structural balance ‐ a negative fiscal impulse 
‐ at a time of economic downturn) signal a countercyclical –and thus stabilizing‐ role 
for fiscal policy. The other two quadrants indicate procyclical fiscal positions. And 
points close to the horizontal axis indicate fiscal episodes that are neutral in relation to 
the economic cycle. The great majority of cycles and fiscal episodes are in the two 
quadrants corresponding to procyclical positions. According to different authors64, the 
procyclicality derives from frequent revisions to the numerical targets but also from 
the rules’ emphasis on balanced budgets or deficit ceilings. In this sense, a way to 
avoid procyclical behaviour in public spending in fiscal rules is to replace annual GDP 
growth as a reference with a measure of the economy’s potential growth (defined ex-
ante). 
The relationship between fiscal policy and the economic cycle can also be 
evaluated through the estimation of a simple linear regression of the variation of the 
adjusted budget balance on the output gap level. A negative coefficient regression βˆ , 
indicates that a positive shock in the economy (that is, a positive GDP gap) is 
associated with deterioration in the fiscal balance, so that fiscal policy is procyclical, 
whereas a positive  coefficient means that fiscal policy is countercyclical (and a zero  
coefficient means that fiscal policy is acyclical). The results of the estimates are shown 
in figure 1, where negative signs are found for either the 1992‐2000 ( βˆ  = ‐0.102) and 
the 2001‐2009 ( βˆ  = ‐0.114) periods (pre and post fiscal rules periods, approximately). 
From a national perspective, Chile, as expected given the nature of its fiscal rule, 
shows a countercyclical pattern, especially in the second period ( βˆ  = 0.47), while in 
Colombia and Peru fiscal policy has been fairly acyclical ( βˆ  around zero in both 
periods). Argentina, Brazil and Mexico show the highest procyclicality with some 
progress in this field in the second period (lower βˆ  in absolute terms). Other studies 
(Vladkova‐Hollar and Zettelmeyer, 2008; and Jimenez and Kacef, 2009) also show that 
                                                 
62
 The fiscal impulse is a measure of whether changes in fiscal policy are adding, or substracting from, 
aggregate demand pressures in the economy. Therefore, automatic fiscal stabilizers are excluded from 
this measure. 
63
 Our thanks go to Ángel Melguizo of the OECD Development Centre for providing us with estimates of 
cyclically adjusted public revenues for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru implementing 
the standardised OECD methodology and extending it to include commodity cycles (following basically 
the IMF approach in Vladkova and Zettelmeyer, 2008). 
64
 See, for example, Izquierdo and Talvi (2008). 
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most countries of the region conducted a less procyclical (in some cases, a broadly 
cyclically neutral) fiscal policy during the years preceding the recent global financial 
crisis, utilizing part of the revenue boom to reduce their public debt (improving also its 
structure and composition) and, in some cases, to build stabilization funds. Céspedes 
and Velasco (2011) focus on the behaviour of fiscal variable across the commodity 
cycle, in contrast to behaviour across the output cycle65, which has been the focus of 
the earlier research of fiscal procyclicality. They find evidence that, contrary to 
previous commodity boom episodes, in the recent episode of increases in commodity 
prices (2003‐08) procyclicality had reduced in most of Latin America (with the 
exception of Venezuela). One of the significant determinants of the cyclicality of 
government expenditures is the existence of a fiscal rule with the expected sign. 
Resisting strong political pressures in those boom years was not easy as shown by 
the Chilean example. In 2007 and 2008, the President of Chile, Michele Bachelet, had a 
low approval rating (see figure 2), especially for the management of the economy. One 
of the reasons for this was the popular resentment that the government had resisted 
intense pressure to spend the soaring receipts from copper exports which had been 
mostly saved. However, since mid‐2009, Bachelet attained a very high approval rating 
which kept through the remainder of the term66. The change took place in a period 
when the global recession hit the Chilean economy (the economy contracted 1.5% in 
2009 and unemployment increased to its highest level in 5 years, 10%). But the 
government increased spending sharply, using the assets that it had acquired during 
the copper boom, and thereby moderated the downturn. As stated by Frankel (2011): 
“…saving for a rainy day made the officials heroes when that rainy day comes, but it is 
very difficult to be a hero in sunny days…”. 
Additionally, calculating the business cycle and the commodity cycle is not 
straightforward. And it is very relevant for the application of rules based on structural 
balances. There is a great degree of uncertainty concerning output gap estimates in 
Latin America as the trends for potential output are compounded with highly volatile 
cyclical shocks. The volatile, uncertain, and exhaustible resource revenues also pose 
significant challenges to fiscal management as it is not easy to distinguish their 
transitory and permanent components. It is a well‐known fact that commodity prices 
are highly persistent and it is hard to reject the hypothesis that they follow a “random 
walk”, i.e., that expected tomorrow’s price is equal to today’s price. Moreover, high 
commodity prices tend to coincide with low interest rates, which makes borrowing 
more attractive, especially for economies that are net debtors, as most Latin American 
countries are. Thus, this has led in the past to spending in excess due to the price‐rise. 
In any case, for the first time in recent decades most countries in the region were 
able to avoid a procyclical fiscal response to a negative shock (the 2008‐09 global 
                                                 
65
 Commodity prices can be claimed to be invariant with respect to policy response in individual 
commodity‐producers in the sample, which ensures that the empirical analysis is free from double‐
causality problems. This is a great advantage over much of the previous literature that examines 
procyclicality with respect to the GDP, which are unquestionably not invariant with respect to domestic 
policy. 
66
 The same can be said about the evolution of the approval rating of her Finance Minister, Andrés 
Velasco. 
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financial crisis) 67. But another shortcoming of the fiscal rules in Latin America is related 
to its behaviour during the recent global crisis (in the presence of low growth or of 
external shocks affecting commodity prices), as most rules were modified, 
incorporating escape clauses to limit the application of numerical rules or to suspend 
them following ad hoc procedures. This should only apply in ex ante predefined 
circumstances, be well designed from the start, and require objective analysis and 
scrutiny to invoke their application to ensure that credibility in the fiscal rule is not 
undermined as shown by the negative experience in Peru’s earlier versions of the fiscal 
rule.  
In most countries fiscal councils do not exist or are institutionally weak. Their 
advice is not binding, critical fiscal policy analysis is almost inexistent68, and budgetary 
accountability and ex‐post evaluation is not substantive. Therefore, a second 
generation of fiscal rules in Latin America should also give a more prominent role to 
independent fiscal agencies in their part as complement to fiscal rules. 
Concluding remarks 
A sound design of fiscal rules and their effective implementation and 
enforcement are far from easy, since they: i) limit the flexibility of policymakers to 
respond to different economic and political challenges, especially in countries with 
small automatic stabilizers; ii) change the balance of power between political actors; 
iii) involve significant trade‐offs among different policy objectives; and, iv) have to be 
tailored to specific economic and institutional characteristics of each country. 
Additionally, the design of fiscal rules needs to be carefully coordinated with the 
monetary stance, to avoid volatility or undesirable sustained pressures on interest 
rates or exchange rates69. The state of a country’s financial system also matters for the 
decision to adopt a fiscal rule, and for its design: if the financial system is in a 
precarious state, likely requiring significant government bailouts, a debt rule may 
become quickly untenable. 
There is no dominance of one rule to the others but rather each involves trade‐
offs in terms of sustainability, cyclicality, volatility of main fiscal variables, and different 
degrees of implementation challenges. Fiscal rules can serve different objectives, such 
as: promote fiscal sustainability, provide fiscal flexibility (ability to respond to shocks) 
in order to promote economic stabilization, contain the size of government, support 
intergenerational equity, increase public infrastructure investment, etc. Each type of 
fiscal rule has different properties relative to key policy objectives. Furthermore, 
priorities may change over time once gains from past policies are achieved, which may 
justify a change of the fiscal rule in place. 
                                                 
67
 Headline fiscal balances fell abruptly, whereas structural fiscal balances fell moderately. 
68
 Multi‐year macroeconomic projections of revenue, expenditure, public investment, and public debt 
are undertaken within the Ministries of Economy and Finance, which are also the actors charged with 
designing and implementing the fiscal policies. Thus, there is room for further strengthening of external 
formal checks‐and‐balances. 
69
 During a commodity boom, increased capital inflows lead to real exchange rate appreciations, 
intensifying the imbalances between commodity‐related industries and other exporting industries like 
manufacturing. 
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As seen in the previous sections, there is a wide variety of fiscal rules in Latin 
America and their targets differ across countries. For example, rules on budget balance 
are subject to some variations: overall balance, current balance (or golden rule so that 
to avoid the crowding‐out of much needed public investment). In some countries, the 
budget balance rule is accompanied by additional limits on total government 
expenditures, primary (noninterest) outlays, interest payments, and/or the wage bill, 
in order to contain the fastest growing components of fiscal imbalance. In other 
countries less procyclical but more information and institutional design demanding 
rules have been adopted. 
At the same time, the institutional coverage of rules depends on the degree of 
fiscal decentralization and autonomy of various levels of government (Chile is a 
relatively centralized fiscal system, in Mexico and Peru decentralization is growing and 
Argentina, Brazil and Colombia have more autonomy). Even in the case of 
decentralized systems there are top‐down systems (Brazil, Colombia, Peru) or cases 
like Argentina, in which, the federal government passed the law only for itself, and this 
set the framework, incentive, or example for the SNGs to have their own fiscal rules 
voluntarily. Therefore, SNGs are starting off from different levels of development and 
of mandates of expenditures. And fiscal rules cannot substitute for well‐designed 
systems of intergovernmental fiscal relations because introducing hard constraints at 
SNGs can adversely affect the quality of public services. Unfortunately, most countries 
in the region lack formal forums for policy dialogue across government levels, the 
formulation of subnational budgets is often carried out without timely inputs by the 
central government, and reporting by the SNGS on their budget execution is subject to 
long delays and based on different accounting rules. Additionally, in cases where SNGS 
have accumulated a large stock of debt, the success of a fiscal rule may require a debt 
rescheduling program with the national government, as suggested by the Argentinean 
and Brazilian experiences. In any case, this is not an easy issue as shown by the recent 
European fiscal crisis. The international experience has been towards not trusting in 
market‐based approaches solely to control subnational borrowing but subnational 
fiscal rules should be enforceable. 
Fiscal rules in Latin America (perhaps with the exceptions of Brazil and Chile) had 
a generally poor start as they were modified repeatedly since first adopted, with fiscal 
performance continuing to deteriorate up until the revisions. This survey has studied 
whether they have served two main objectives: fiscal sustainability and the capacity to 
respond to shocks with better grades on the former. It has also offered some 
suggestions to improve the fiscal rule frameworks. In any case, although they can help, 
fiscal rules are neither necessary nor sufficient to achieve fiscal discipline. 
One last aspect that should never be forgotten is that the fiscal rules can be 
regarded as a formal expression of the political will to maintain fiscal discipline. So 
when the framework is substantially diluted or abandoned after introduction means 
nothing: a rules‐based fiscal policy alone, without the political will to enforce it, is 
doomed to failure.  
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TABLE 1. Key characteristics of fiscal rules in Latin America. 
COUNTRY ORIGINAL LAW 
LAST 
MODIFICATION 
CYCLICAL 
STABILIZATI
ON 
LEVEL OF 
GOVT.
1
 
NUMERICAL 
TARGET FOR 
BALANCE/EXPENDI
TURE 
NUMERICAL 
TARGET FOR 
DEBT (SNGs) 
RELATED 
INSTITUTION 
STATUTORY 
BASE 
GOLDEN 
RULE 
ESCAPE 
CLAUSE 
Argentina 
Ley 25.152 de 
Solvencia Fiscal 
(1999) 
Ley 25.917, 
Régimen 
General de 
Responsabilidad 
Fiscal (2004) 
NO 
CG, SNG 
(agreement 
with CG) 
Nominal growth of 
primary 
expenditure must 
not exceed nominal 
GDP growth 
Debt servicing 
does not exceed 
15% of current 
resources 
Consejo Federal de 
Responsabilidad 
Fiscal 
High level 
legislation 
YES NO 
Brazil 
Lei de 
Responsabilidade 
Fiscal e Finanças 
Publicas Municipais 
(2000) 
2009 NO 
NFPS 
(without 
Petrobras) 
Current equilibrium 
(SNG); primary 
surplus (CG) 
Annual borrowing 
limits 
Fundo Soberano do 
Brasil 
High level 
legislation 
YES YES 
Chile 
Ley 20.128 sobre 
Responsabilidad 
Fiscal (2006) 
2011 YES CG 
Overall structural 
balance 
 
Fondo de 
Estabilización 
Económica y Social/ 
Fondo de Reserva 
de Pensiones 
High level 
legislation 
NO NO 
Colombia
2 Ley 358 de 
Semáforos (1997) 
Ley 819 de 
Responsabilidad 
Fiscal (2003) 
NO NFPS Primary surplus 
Borrowing limits 
determined by 
solvency and 
liquidity 
indicators 
 
High level 
legislation 
NO NO 
Mexico 
Ley Federal de 
Presupuesto y 
Responsabilidad 
Hacendaria (2006) 
2010 SOME CG Current equilibrium  
1
st
 tier and 2
nd
 tier 
Fondos de 
Estabilización 
High level 
legislation 
NO YES 
Peru 
Ley 27.245 de 
Prudencia y 
Transparencia Fiscal 
(1999) 
2007 NO NFPS 
Deficit below 1% of 
GDP for NFPS; real 
growth of 
consumption 
expenditure below 
 
Fondo de 
Estabilización Fiscal 
High level 
legislation 
YES YES 
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4% per year for CG 
Venezuela 
(Bolivarian 
Republic of) 
2000  NO CG Current equilibrium  
Fondo de 
Estabilización 
Macroeconómica 
   
Source: National laws and references cited in the text. 
1
 CG= Central Government; NFPS = Nonfinancial public sector; SNG = Subnational governments.
2
 As explained in 
Section 5, Specific regulations are being developed for the implementation of a cyclically adjusted fiscal rule. 
 
Table 2. Numerical targets of the fiscal rules for Argentina (1) 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Current central government spending (% nominal change)         
Target 23.0 24.1 25.2 10.9 25.9 
Execution 18.6 20.1 27.1 9.1 21.0 
Fulfillment? √ ¿?(2) ¿?(2) ¿?(3) ¿?(3) 
Source: Compliance assessment reports prepared by the Federal Council of Fiscal Responsibility.     
            
(1) Numerical (spending and debt) rules for subnational governments are not included in this table. In the same way, debt and public 
balance rules for the central government are not considered. 
(2) Expenditure on education to satisfy the Law no. 26,075 and payments due to judicial sentences are substracted from the current 
expenditure. Without this deduction the nominal current public spending was many points above the ceiling. 
(3) During 2009 and 2010, according to law number 26,530, public expenditures related to promoting economic activity, sustaining the 
level of employment, health insurance and social assistance were excluded from the current government spending. 
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2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Consolidated primary budget surplus (% GDP)(1)
Indicative target 3.35 3.5 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.25 3.8(2) 3.8 2.5(4) 3.3 3.3
Execution 3.6 3.9 4.3 4.6 4.8 4.3 3.9 4.1(3) 2.0 (5) 2.8(5) 3.1
Fulfillment? √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ ¿?(6) x ¿?(7)
Sources : Minis tério do Planejamento and yea rly Lei de Diretrizes Orçamentarias.
(2) The target was  set at 4.25% of GDP and then re‐s et at 3.8% fol lowing a  revi s ion of the national  accounts , which increas ed nominal  GDP by about 11%.
(3) Net of a  capi ta l  injection of 0.5% of GDP into the Sovereign Weal th Fund.
(4) The target was  partly reduced due to the exclus ion of Petrobras  from the publ ic‐sector aggregate (Petrobras  registered a  0.5% of GDP primary surplus  in 2008).
(5) Substantia l  qua s i‐fi sca l  s timulus  through net transfers  from the Treasury to BNDES i s  not recorded.
(6) The government can exclude investment spending when ca lculating the primary budget s urplus  (publ i c investment adjustor). To reach the ta rget, the adjustor was  us ed to a  va lue of 0.5 percent of GDP.
(7) Parl iament changed the target during the yea r as  a l low by the fi sca l  rule and the new one wa s  s ati s fied.
Table 3. Numerical targets of the fiscal rule for Brazil.
(1) The targets  refer to those set for the centra l  government and i ts  publ i c enterpris es  in the Budget Guidel ines  Laws  (LDO in Portuguese), together with the expected outturn for the regiona l  governments  (s tates  and 
municipa l i ties ) and thei r publ ic enterpri ses .
 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Structural surplus (% GDP)
Target 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 ‐1.8
Execution(1) 1.1 0.8 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.4 1.1 ‐0.8 ‐3.0 ‐2.0 ‐1.5
Fulfillment? √ √ √ √ √ √ √ x x x √
Sources : Dirección de Presupuestos .
(1) Structura l  ba lance according to s imulations  taking into a ccount the recommendations  of the Corbo Commission  as  found in the "Informe de Finanzas  Públ icas  para  el  Pres upuesto 2012". 
Table 4. Numerical targets of the fiscal rule for Chile.
 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
NFPS primary surplus (% GDP)
Indicative target 2.5 2.6 2.6 2.6 1.9 0.1 0.0
Execution 3.3 3.2 3.0 3.5 0.9 ‐0.1
Fulfillment? √ √ √ √ x x
Sources: Ministerio de Hacienda  y Crédi to Públ ico of Colombia  and yearly Medium Term Fisca l  Framework reports .
(1) Numerica l  rules  for subnationa l  governments  are not included in this  table
Table 5. Numerical targets of the fiscal rule for Colombia(1)
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2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Traditional balance (% GDP)(1)
Target 0.0 0.0 ‐0.6 ‐0.7 ‐0.5
Execution 0.0 ‐0.1 ‐0.2 ‐0.8 ‐0.6
Fulfillment? √ √ √ √ √
Source: Secretaría  de Hacienda  y de Crédi to Públ ico de México.
(1) The tradi tional  ba lance excludes  inves tment by PEMEX. There was  a  break in the series  in 2009.
Table 6. Numerical targets of the fiscal rule for Mexico.
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009(5) 2010(5) 2011
NFPS overall deficit (% GDP)
Target 2.0 1.5 1.0 2.0 1.5 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 2.0 1.0
Execution 3.3 2.7 2.2 1.7 1.1 0.3 ‐2.3 ‐2.9 ‐2.3 1.3 0.3 ‐1.8
Fulfillment? x x x √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
General government expenditure (% real change) (2)
Target 2.0 1.5 1.0 2.0 1.5 1.0 1.0
Execution 4.7 ‐0.7 4.2 3.8 4.2 9.8 3.7
Fulfillment? x √ x x x x x
Central government consumption (% real change) (3), (4)
Target 3.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 4.0
Execution 0.4 4.9 13.3 8.0 10.9
Fulfillment? √ x x x x
Sources: IMF estimates  and Centra l  Bank of Peru (BCRP).
(1) Numeri cal  rules  for subnati onal  governments  are not included in this  table.
(2) Deflated by GDP deflator.
(3) Consumption compris es  spending on wages  and s a laries , goods  and services , and pens i ons.
(4) Deflated by i nflation target of BCRP (2%).
(5) Excepti onal  claus es  in appl ication.
Table 7. Numerical targets of the fiscal rules for Peru(1)
 
 
